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Introduction
most popular form of tourism. Package holidays are configured from a variety of service providers such as enterprises that offer accommodation, Although independent travel has become increasingly attractive to younger generations over transportation, and excursions, which together form the so-called tourism supply chain (TSC) the past decade, package holidays are still the discussed in this article. A schematic diagram of package holidays may cause overbooking and lead to a supply shortage. Another uncertainty associ-a typical TSC for package holidays at a certain destination is shown in Figure 1 . As the customers ated with package holidays is seasonality. It is beyond dispute that demand uncertainty at the downstream end of a TSC, tourists purchase package holidays from travel agents. Tour opera-will lead to significant losses for business entities involved in a TSC. Researchers believe that an ap-tors organize a series of activities as package holiday products for travel agents (Budeanu, 2005;  propriate strategy of supply chain coordination can help to mitigate the negative effects of demand Tapper & Font, 2007) . Travel agents and tour operators can be housed within the same or separate uncertainty. Coordination is a pattern of decision making and communication among a set of actors business entities. Services provided by midstream enterprises, such as theme parks, shopping centers, who perform tasks to achieve goals (Malone, 1987) . Accordingly, supply chain coordination can hotels, and transportation operators, are amalgamated by tour operators. Further upstream, enter-be regarded as a pattern of decision making and communication among supply chain participants prises provide raw materials and services to midstream TSC enterprises.
who perform tasks to achieve common goals (e.g., maximizing supply chain profit). Uncertainty about future demand is one of the most significant characteristics of the tourism in-A TSC consisting of multiple tour operators and accommodation providers (i.e., hotels) in-dustry (Gómez & Sinclair, 1991) . A number of factors, both internal and external, can result in volves two different types of coordination program. The first occurs when tour operators reserve uncertainty over the level of demand for package holidays. For example, excessive advertising of too many rooms and cannot fill their reservations, in which case they may transfer overbookings to turn unused reservations to hotel chains when they have overbooked. Game models are established those who have made insufficient reservations. In this study, we call such programs horizontal coor-for the conditions of noncoordination, horizontal coordination, and vertical coordination, respec-dination within a TSC. In general, these programs involve the coordination of homogeneous partici-tively. The models are then analyzed to find an optimal equilibrium for each condition. We subse-pants at the same echelon of a TSC.
The second type of coordination program oc-quently compare the two coordination models to establish which is more efficient in mitigating the curs when tour operators that have reserved too many (or too few) hotel rooms consider returning negative effects of demand uncertainty. The TSC and the different TSC coordination programs stud-(or repurchasing) overbooked (or underbooked) rooms to (or from) hotels. We argue that tour op-ied and compared in this article are illustrated in Figure 2 . erators do not choose to offset their losses by increasing their room rates. If they do so, sales of The rest of this article is organized as follows. In the next section, the essential literature relevant package tours would fall and the reputations of TSC players would be damaged. Therefore, tour to this study is reviewed. The following section operators are likely to limit themselves to two formulates game models for the cases of noncoorchoices: returning overbooked rooms or repurdination, horizontal coordination, and vertical cochasing hotel rooms to cover a shortage. In this ordination, respectively. Game equilibria are also study, we refer to this practice as the vertical cooranalyzed. In the fourth section, we derive some dination of a TSC. In general, it involves heterogeuseful managerial implications from the equilibria neous participants at different echelons of a TSC. of the game models by means of comparison. Our A large number of previous analyses have been general conclusions and the limitations of this carried out on supply chain coordination stratestudy are discussed in the last section. gies, with a particular focus on the manufacturing industry. To the best of our knowledge, no in-depth Literature Review analytical research on coordination strategies re-Capacity exchange mechanisms can be used to lated to the tourism industry has been carried out.
smooth demand uncertainty (Hogendorn, 2006) . In There has been a particular lack of analysis using this article, this type of mechanism is employed to game-theoretic approaches, although the effectiveexamine equilibrium solutions to the reservation ness of game theory in studying manufacturing capacities of tour operators in TSCs, as well as to supply chain coordination has been proven (Parlar argue that the net profits tour operators can expect & Wang, 1994; Rosenblatt & Lee, 1985; Viswana- to make under capacity exchange conditions are than & Wang, 2003; Wang, 2002) . The main obhigher than those they can expect to make under jective of this article is to use a game-theoretic conditions of nonexchange. approach to examine the effects of different coor-
The literature relevant to this study can be didination strategies used in TSCs for package holivided into research on TSCs for package holidays, days. As described above, the TSC studied in this studies on the application of game theory to the article consists of multiple tour operators and hotourism industry, and the literature on demand untels. Hotels form chains to maintain their competicertainty problems. tiveness in terms of occupancy rate (Aguiló, Alegre, The profile of the TSC for package holidays & Sard, 2002). The use of both horizontal and verhas been discussed by Font, Tapper, Schwartz, and tical coordination programs in the TSC is exam- Kornilaki (2008) . Both Budeanu (2005) and Tepeined. Specifically, in the horizontal coordination lus (2005) pointed out that tour operators play a program, tour operators with a lower level of dekey role in the tourism and hospitality industries. mand for their products exchange extra rooms
The literature also covers hotel room occupancy with tour operators that have a higher level of de- (Pan, 2007) and oligopolistic hotel pricing (Baum mand at a contractual exchange price. In the verti-& Mudambi, 1995). Buhalis (2000) showed that cal coordination program, tour operators repurchase rooms from hotel chains to cover shortages or re-the main area of competition between hotels and 290 ZHANG ET AL. tour operators centers on profit margins and occu-Medina-Muñoz and García-Falcón (2000) identified the determinants of successful relationships pancy rates. Tse (2003) put forward some suggestions on how travel agents should counter hotel between hotels and travel agents. Theuvsen (2004) claimed that coordination among enterprises can disintermediation. R. D. Medina-Muñoz, Medina-Muñoz, and García-Falcón (2003) studied the phe-benefit the tourism industry. These studies form the foundation for this study with respect to the nomenon whereby hotels compete with their tour operator partners for a larger share of profits. discussion on cooperation and competition among tour operators and coordination between tour oper-Wong and Kwan (2001) investigated the competitive strategies of hotels and travel agents and ators and hotels under demand uncertainty.
Although the use of game-theoretic approaches called for cooperation between the two sectors. D.
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to analyze typical TSC problems is a relatively change methods are used to smooth the demand shocks in the TSC. new research area, it has become increasingly popular in recent years. For example, Taylor (1998) evaluated the strategic pricing behavior of package Model Formulation tour operators by setting up a game-theoretic model. Candela and Cellini (2003) utilized differ-
We consider a TSC that has N(N ≥ 2) tour operent oligopoly models to investigate tourism develators (TO) denoted by the subscript j = 1, 2, . . . , opment strategies. Wie (2005) developed a nonco-N and one hotel chain. For simplicity, we assume operative dynamic game to study strategic capacity that each TO provides only one type of package investment in the cruise line industry. García and holiday product and that the products provided by Tugores (2006) explained the rationale for the codifferent tour operators are imperfectly substitutexistence of high-and low-quality hotels using a able. All package holiday products include one vertical differentiation duopoly model. To the best night of accommodation provided by the hotel of our knowledge, demand uncertainty problems chain. The tour operators reserve rooms in adthat arise in TSCs have not been studied analytivance with the hotel chain at the same price accally using game-theoretic approaches.
cording to their demand predictions, which are of-However, demand uncertainty problems have ten higher or lower than actual demand due to been discussed extensively in other industries.
demand uncertainty. The price per unit of TO j is Fisher and Raman (1996) claimed that accurate rep j . Following the same approach as that used in sponses to early sales can reduce the costs result-Carr and Karmarkar (2005), all of the TOs are asing from demand uncertainty. Fisher, Hammond, sumed to have identical constant marginal cost c. Obermeyer, and Raman (1997) presented a model TO j reserves a certain number (k j ) of rooms acto quantify the impact of adjusting the levers of cording to its prediction at a given price (w) and demand uncertainty. Marvel and Peck (1995) sells package holidays to tourists. We also assume showed that return policies are helpful in smooththat demand forecasting errors occur due to uncering demand uncertainty. Mantrala and Raman tainties, but that total capacity remains unchanged. (1999) investigated the impacts of demand vari-Following many other studies (e.g., Hogendorn, ability on buyback and wholesale prices. Return 2006), we assume a linear inverse demand funcpolicies have been widely used to moderate the tion for TO j as follows: impact of demand uncertainty. By contrast, capacity exchange policies have rarely been applied to
(1) deal with such problems. Kwoka (2001) studied exchanges in the automobile industry and noted that competitive concerns over B2B exchanges fall into two broad categories-those involving the fi-
The ratio γ β captures the degree of substitution benal output of the exchange participants (e.g., cars) and those involving the products transacted on the tween different package holidays. γ = 0 indicates that the relevant products are independent, and γ = exchanges themselves (e.g., wiring or tires) (pp. 66). Hogendorn (2006) employed a game-theoretic β indicates that the relevant products are perfect substitutes. In this study, we consider the case model to compare a capacity exchange strategy with a nonexchange strategy under demand uncer-where α > 0 and 0 < γ < β. In addition, the demand for TO j includes a random shock (ε j ), with an ex-tainty. Some studies have also referred to overbooking problems that arise between tour opera-pected value of 0 and a constant variance of σ 2 . The random shocks affecting different tour opera-tors and hotels. For example, Hadjinicola and Panayi (1997) argued that hotels should adopt an tors are not correlated. In the following subsections, we propose and overbooking policy at either the hotel level or the tour operator level. This article considers the TSC analyze the game models for the noncoordination, horizontal coordination, and vertical coordination overbooking problem to be a demand shortage problem, and both return policy and capacity ex-cases, respectively.
Noncoordination
To maximize π j , the exchange capacity of TO j is (note that remains unchanged) In the noncoordination situation, the TSC members studied in this article do not adopt any capacity exchange or return policies. In this case, the linear inverse demand function for TO j is the same (1). Therefore, the objective function for TO j is
The total amount of capacity sold in the exchange must be equal to the total amount purchased;
Combining this condition, we obtain the equilibrium exchange price, By running a game among the tour operators, we obtain the equilibrium reservation capacity,
where superscript "NC" stands for the noncoordi-
Substituting equation (9) into equation (8), we Substituting equation (3) into equation (1), we have obtain the expected product price,
At equilibrium, the expected net profit of each
TO is
In particular, we have E(ε j ) = 0, E(ε i ε j ) = 0∀i ≠ j, and E(ε j 2 ) = σ 2 . Therefore, the expected net
In the horizontal coordination case, we assume
(10) that if TO j needs δ j , additional rooms on top of those it has reserved, it buys enough rooms to cover the shortage from the other TOs at exchange Solving ∂E(π j ) ∂k j = 0 leads to the following equilibprice s; if it has δj unused rooms, then it sells them rium reservation capacity of TO j . at price. Therefore, the linear inverse demand function for TO j can be written as
where the superscript HC stands for horizontal co-The objective function for TO j is ordination. Substituting equation (11) into equation (6), we obtain the expected product price, Max π j (k j ,s) = (p j − c)(k j + δj) − wk j − sδ j (7)
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The total amount of capacity purchased on the E(p HC j ) = βα + [β + γ(N − 1)](c + w) 2β + γ(N − 1) . (12) market is equal to the total amount returned, which means ∑ N i=1 θ i = 0. Combining this condition, Substituting equation (11) into equation (10), we arrive at the expected net profit of TO j :
we obtain the equilibrium reservation capacity for TO j :
− θ j . (18) In the vertical coordination case, we assume that if TO j needs more rooms (θ j ) than it has reserved (k j ), it repurchases enough rooms to cover Therefore, the expected product price and the exthe shortage from the hotel chain at a trading price pected net profit for TO j are (r 1 ); if it has unused rooms (θ j ), then it returns them to the hotel chain at price r 2 . In this situation,
2β + γ(N − 1) we assume that r 1 = w + ∆ and r 2 = w − ∆ (w is the wholesale price and ∆ is the deposit fee, which is a constant). This means that the tour operators will and repurchase rooms to cover any room shortage at a higher price and lose any deposit for overbooking. (1) and the above assumption, the demand function for TO j is
where the superscript VC stands for vertical coor-The objective function for TO j is dination.
Max π j (k j ) = (p j − c − w)(k j + θ j ) − ∆*θ j * (15) A Comparative Analysis of the Different Coordination Models To maximize π j , TO j reserves the room capacity, In this section, we derive some useful managerial implications by comparing the results from the game models described above. We first compare reduce demand uncertainty and the impact of coordination strategy on optimal TSC decisions. We then compare the results from the horizontal and k j = α − c − w + ε j 2β − γ (17) vertical coordination cases to establish which model is more effective in reducing demand un-
Coordination and Noncoordination
Horizontal Coordination and Noncoordination. [The derivation of equation (17) is available from the corresponding author upon request.]
Firstly, from equations (3) and (11), we have the market, horizontal coordination is more benk HC = γ − c − w 2β + γ(N − 1) = k NC , which leads to the foleficial than noncoordination both to individual tour operators and to the industry as a whole, lowing theorem.
although the homogeneous profits of individual Theorem 1: Horizontal coordination does not imtour operators decrease under both horizontal pact the level of tour operators' reservations.
coordination and noncoordination conditions. (The derivation of Proposition 2 is available This theorem indicates that tour operators do from the corresponding author upon request.) not need to change their reservation decisions, regardless of whether they choose to coordinate with Proposition 3: When the degree of substitution (γ/ each other. The theorem implies that horizontal β) of package holidays increases (or the level of coordination will not result in additional costs for differentiation among products decreases), horithe tour operators concerned.
zontal coordination becomes more beneficial Secondly, comparing equations (4) and (12), than noncoordination, although the homogewe can see that the expected product price for inneous profits of individual tour operators dedividual tour operators in the horizontal coordinacrease under both horizontal coordination and tion case is the same as the price in the noncoordinoncoordination conditions. (The derivation of nation case. This leads to Theorem 2.
Proposition 3 is available from the corresponding author upon request.) Theorem 2: Horizontal coordination does not When the degree of substitution of package change the price of package holidays.
holidays increases or the level of differentiation This theorem implies that the decision makers among products decreases, competition between within the tour operators concerned are unable to tour operators intensifies. In other words, the change their pricing strategies in the horizontal coabove proposition implies that in a fiercely comordination case.
petitive tourism market, tour operators prefer to Thirdly, from equations (5) and (13), we have: establish coordination relationships with each other.
Vertical Coordination and Noncoordination. A
comparison of the results obtained under the respective conditions of noncoordination and verti-Bear in mind that the number of tour operators is cal coordination shows that the equilibrium prod-N > 1 and that the degree of substitution of packuct price charged by individual tour operators is age holidays is 0 < γ/β < 1. Therefore, equation the same in both cases. In other words, the follow-(20) implies Theorem 3.
ing theorem holds.
Theorem 3: A horizontal coordination strategy is
Theorem 4: Vertical coordination between tour more effective for dealing with demand shocks operators and hotel chains does not change the for tour operators.
price of package holidays. We also find that the impact of demand shocks Analyzing equation (20), we also obtain the on tour operators' profits in the vertical coordinafollowing three propositions. tion case are related to the scale of individual tour Proposition 1: When the variance of a random operators, the degree of substitution of package shock is larger, horizontal coordination beholidays, the size of the deposit, and exchange cacomes more beneficial.
pacity. This proposition indicates that when demand A Comparison Between Horizontal uncertainty increases, the benefits of horizontal and Vertical Coordination coordination for individual tour operators also in-Rewriting equations (13) and (19) We can see that two variables, x and N, can affect E(π HC j ) = β(α − c − w) 2 [2β + γ(N − 1)] 2 + (N − 1)σ 2 4(β − γ)N , the value of F. First considering F as a function of x, we find that F(x) has only one root (we call it x 1 ), where x 1 ∈ (0,1) (the derivation of this result and the net profit expected under vertical coordiis available from the corresponding author upon nation, request), and when x > x 1 , F(x) > 0. Because x denotes the degree of substitution of package holiday products, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 5: When the degree of substitution of package holidays is high, horizontal coordina-
tion is more beneficial in smoothing demand shocks than vertical coordination. In the following discussion, we ignore the de-As a decrease in the level of differentiation posit losses in the above equation. (The deposit among products leads to more intense competition losses have a negative impact on the expected between tour operators, the above theorem indiprofits of individual tour operators under vertical cates that under conditions of fierce competition, coordination. In this article, we first ignore the tour operators prefer to establish a horizontal coordeposit losses, which lead to inflated profits for dination relationship with each other. individual tour operators under vertical coordi-
We now present a numerical example of F(x). nation. If the inflated profits under vertical coor-
The simulative curve for F(x) when there are six dination are still smaller than the expected proftour operators in the market (N = 6) is shown in its of individual tour operators under horizontal Figure 3 .. coordination, we can compare the two coordina-From Figure 3 , we can see that when the degree tion cases without taking deposit losses into of substitution of package holidays, for example, account.) Here, we can compare the net profits
x, is less than 0.62, vertical coordination is more under horizontal and vertical coordination conbeneficial than horizontal coordination. The differditions by comparing u = (N − 1)σ 2 4(β − γ)N with ence between the two coordination schemes is an increase function of x when x is less than 0.26 and is a decreasing function of x when x is greater than v = β[(2β + γN) 2 − 3γ 2 (N − 1)]σ 2 (2β − γ) 2 [2β + γ(N − 1)] 2 . To compare u 0.38. The difference is not sensitive when x is beand v, we define tween 0.26 and 0.38. On the other hand, when x is greater than 0.62, horizontal coordination is more beneficial than vertical coordination. The differ-
. ence between the two coordination schemes is an increase function of x. Now let us consider F as a function of N. We If f > 1, then u > v; if f < 1, then u = v; if f = 1, then find that when 0 < x < 0.8925, F(N) has only one u = v. Dividing the numerator and the denominator root n (the derivation of this result is available of f by β 4 and letting x = γ/β(0 < x < 1), we obtain from the corresponding author upon request).
Proposition 4: The entry of new tour operators
. (21) may make horizontal coordination more profitable than vertical coordination both to individual tour operators and to the industry as a whole Let F denote the difference between the numerator when the degree of substitution of package holiand the denominator of f, giving us days is sufficiently low.
This proposition implies that an expansion in the size of the industry increases the intensity of − 4N(1 − x) 
competition. Therefore, incumbent firms are likely vations with a hotel chain. The second strategy into prefer the strategy of exchanging their shortvolves vertical coordination in which tour operaages/unused capacity with each other to reduce detors repurchase/return rooms to cover any shortages/ mand shocks.
unused reservations from/to their supplier (e.g., a If we assume x = 0.5 and 3 ≤ N ≤ 17, then the hotel chain). Game models are established both for following example shows the numerical path for the two coordination cases and for the noncoordi-F(N). nation case. From Figure 4 , we can see that when x = 0.5 Equilibrium solutions are derived and comand 3 ≤ N ≤ 9, F(N) < 0. This means that under pared to generate managerial implications. One of such conditions, vertical coordination is more benthe general conclusions of the study is that both eficial than horizontal coordination. However, coordination strategies can be used to smooth out when N increases to above 9, the results show that demand uncertainties and enable TSC players to this trend reverses. That is, when the number of achieve better results. We also find that horizontal tour operators in the market increases, horizontal coordination does not affect either the level of tour coordination is more beneficial than vertical cooroperators' reservations or the price of package holdination.
idays. When more tour operators enter the market or product differentiation decreases, we find that Concluding Remarks the horizontal coordination is preferred to the vertical coordination. This article uses a game-theoretic approach to
One potential limitation of this study is that we investigate the effects of two different coordinahave assumed market demand for package holition strategies on a TSC for package holidays undays is constant overtime. This assumption may der conditions of uncertain demand. The first stratbe too restrictive. For instance, extremely bad egy is a horizontal coordination in which tour operators exchange their shortages/unused reser-weather or a disaster at the relevant destination game-theoretic models are likely to be more ap- Candela, G., & Cellini, R. (2003, September complex game models are required to account for (1997) . Configuring a supply chain to reduce the cost the competition between alternative hotels in the of demand uncertainty. Production and Operations same chain. Management, 6(3), 211-225. Fisher, M., & Raman, A. (1996) . Reducing the cost of demand uncertainty through accurate response to early
